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Abstract—Implicit interactions refer to those interactions
among the components of a system that may be unintended
and/or unforeseen by the system designers. As such, they repre-
sent cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can be exploited to mount
cyber-attacks causing serious and destabilizing system effects. In
this paper, we study implicit interactions in distributed systems
specified using the algebraic modeling framework known as
Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra (C2KA). To identify
and defend against a range of possible attack scenarios, we
develop a new measure of exploitability for implicit interactions
to aid in evaluating the threat posed by the existence of such
vulnerabilities in system designs for launching cyber-attacks.
The presented approach is based on the modeling and analysis
of the influence and response of the system agents and their
C2KA specifications. We also demonstrate the applicability of
the proposed approach using a prototype tool that supports the
automated analysis. The rigorous, practical techniques presented
here enable cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the designs of dis-
tributed systems to be more easily identified, assessed, and then
mitigated, offering significant improvements to overall system
resilience, dependability, and security.
Index Terms—Implicit interactions, Communicating Concur-
rent Kleene Algebra (C2KA), exploitability, attack scenarios,
cybersecurity.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Implicit interactions refer to component interactions within
a distributed system that may be unfamiliar, unplanned, or
unexpected, and either not visible or not immediately com-
prehensible by the system designers [1]. These kinds of
interactions have also been referred to as hidden interactions
in the literature, although it is not necessary that they are
intentionally hidden from the view of the system designers.
Implicit interactions represent previously unknown linkages
among system components. Because system designers are gen-
erally unaware of such linkages, they indicate the presence of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers.
This can have severe consequences in terms of the system’s
safety, security, and reliability.
In previous work [1], [2], we developed a rigorous and
systematic approach for identifying the existence of implicit
interactions in distributed systems. The approach involves the
specification and analysis of the communication among system
components using the Communicating Concurrent Kleene Al-
gebra (C2KA) modeling framework [3], [4]. More specifically,
the approach verifies whether each possible interaction in
a given system exists as part of a characterization of the
intended system interactions resulting from the system design.
In any system engineering process, the articulation of the
expected behaviour and operation of the system results in a
set of intended sequences of communication and interaction
among the components of the system. This set of intended
interactions is typically derived from the system description
and requirements explicitly provided by the system designer.
Therefore, any interaction that is found to deviate from this
expected or intended behaviour is an implicit interaction.
However, while identifying the existence of these vulnera-
bilities is a critically important initial step, it is also necessary
to examine whether they are likely to manifest in real-world
systems [1]. A natural next step is to determine the ways in
which such vulnerabilities can be exploited to mount a cyber-
attack in the system. This information is critical in assessing
the severity of the vulnerabilities, as well as in determining
measures to mitigate the potential that they could be exploited
in an attack.
In this paper, we present an approach for evaluating the
exploitability of implicit interactions in distributed system
designs. The approach is based on attack scenario deter-
mination, which looks to find the set of possible ways in
which a compromised system agent can exploit a particular
implicit interaction to mount a cyber-attack that influences the
behaviour of other agents in the system. The attack scenario
determination involves an analysis of the set of implicit
interactions identified using the technique proposed in [2] and
the C2KA specification of the system. Using the results of
the attack scenario determination for an identified implicit
interaction, we compute a measure of its exploitability to more
accurately assess the threat that it poses to the overall safety,
security, and reliability of the system. Thus, the key objective
of this paper is to provide a systematic approach for evaluating
the ways in which implicit interactions can be used to mount
cyber-attacks in a given system, as well as specific guidance
on ways to modify system designs to reduce the potential
exposure to such attacks. Note that while critically important,
in this paper, we are not assessing the potential impact that
a cyber-attack resulting from the exploitation of an implicit
interaction may have on a given system, but rather the ways in
which an attacker may use an implicit interaction to affect the
behaviour of the system in order to support the development
of methodologies and mechanisms for achieving systems with
improved dependability and security.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
compares and contrasts our proposed approach with related
work. Section III provides the required background for the
approach and associated mathematical framework, and Sec-
tion IV outlines an illustrative example that will be used
to demonstrate the proposed approach throughout this paper.
Section V provides a high-level overview of the proposed
approach for readers that wish to forgo the technical details
provided in Sections VI–VIII. Section VI develops the theo-
retical background required for analyzing the influence and
response of agents in a distributed system specified using
C2KA. Section VII articulates the proposed approach for
determining the possible attack scenarios that can exploit
implicit interactions. Section VIII presents a measure of the
exploitability of an implicit interaction. Section IX presents
a summary of our experimental results in evaluating the
exploitability of implicit interactions and provides a discussion
of the proposed approach. Lastly, Section X concludes and
discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we compare and contrast our contributions
with the existing literature related to assessing the exploitabil-
ity of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and studying information
flows, dependence, and causality in distributed systems.
A. Threat Modeling and Risk Management Frameworks
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [5] is
largely considered the de facto standard for quantifying and
assessing the severity and risk of security vulnerabilities in
computing systems. CVSS metrics are designed to measure the
fundamental characteristics of vulnerabilities that can be used
to compute measures of exploitability. In CVSS, exploitability
is a function of metrics called access vector, access complex-
ity, and authentication. The access vector metric provides a
measure of how a vulnerability is exploited (e.g., locally or
remotely). The access complexity metric provides a measure
of the amount of effort that is needed to exploit a vulnerability
once a malicious agent has gained access to the system. Lastly,
the authentication metric provides a measure of the number of
times that a malicious agent needs to authenticate itself to
successfully exploit the vulnerability. A number of additional
frameworks for measuring cybersecurity-related vulnerabilities
and risks, such as the OCTAVE risk management frame-
work [6] and the Microsoft Exploitability Index [7], have also
been proposed. More recently, extensions to CVSS that use
stochastic modeling to aid in improving decision making and
reducing risk have been proposed (e.g., [8]).
However, CVSS and its associated exploitability analysis, as
well as other similar frameworks, have received much criticism
due to their perceived subjectivity and lack of specificity in
the ways in which values are measured and assigned (e.g., [9],
[10]). By developing a rigorous technique for determining
the ways in which a vulnerability can be exploited based on
the system specification and design, the approach proposed in
this paper, as well as the developed measure of exploitability,
avoids this kind of subjectivity and lack of specificity.
B. Attack Surfaces
Generally speaking, attack surfaces are related to expo-
sures enabling a malicious agent to mount a cyber-attack on
a system. Attack surfaces are typically considered along a
number of different dimensions including interfaces, channels,
protocols, and access rights, among others. The intuition
behind analyzing and measuring a system’s attack surface is
based on the idea that the more extensive and exposed the
system’s attack surface is, the more opportunity for a malicious
agent to conduct an attack [11]. Therefore, many approaches
aim to improve security by reducing the attack surface of the
system in question. An important element of this process is
understanding the system’s attack surface. For example, [11]
proposed a metric called the Relative Attack Surface Quotient.
This was expanded upon in [12] which additionally proposed
considering the damage potential-effort ratios associated with
possible attacks. A similar approach was proposed in [13].
More recently researchers have looked to assess the likelihood
of an attack by considering the possibility for individual, co-
ordinated, and concurrent attacks [14]. New approaches have
also developed more objective metrics derived from attack
surface, vulnerability, and exploitation analyses by studying
software properties [10].
However, attack surface metrics are often designed to
measure the exploitability of an entire system, rather than
the exploitability of individual vulnerabilities. By comparison,
the proposed approach studies the exploitability of each in-
dividually identified vulnerability (i.e., each implicit interac-
tion). Consequently, this allows us to obtain information that
can help in determining where and how to spend valuable
resources to mitigate the most severe, or most exploitable,
vulnerabilities.
C. Formal Verification and Test-Based Approaches
Many existing approaches for conducting vulnerability and
exploitability analyses involve the development high-level
models of system components for which security-relevant
properties can be formalized and analyzed to verify their
satisfaction in the composite system. For example, [15] pro-
posed formal approaches for specifying desired security prop-
erties and conducting vulnerability and exploitability analyses.
Also, [16] proposed the Correlated Attack Modeling Language
(CAML) to help in automatically identifying cyber-attack sce-
narios.
Other approaches look to perform formal verification and
analyses on program code. The use of such techniques for
specifying and analyzing systems is often highly desirable
when developing systems with high standards of safety, secu-
rity, and reliability [17]. In [18], a symbolic analysis approach
that operates on disassembled binary code to identify condi-
tions by which a malicious agent can exploit a “dangerous
path” was proposed. In [19], an approach for verifying pro-
grams represented in a specialized modeling language using
a formal security domain model was presented. The approach
aimed to detect execution paths that violated the security prop-
erties specified in the domain model. However, the ability to
identify and analyze exploitable vulnerabilities at earlier stages
of system development was desired. As such, [20] provided an
approach that studied system architectures to identify possible
scenarios and metrics, similar to those derived for attack
surfaces, that can be used to determine which system vulnera-
bilities may be exploitable. The possible scenarios and security
metric signatures were formalized using the Object Constraint
Language. This allowed for the development of an approach
supporting both metric-based and scenario-based architecture
security analysis. Similarly, [21] provided a constraint-based
approach for identifying and mitigating cascading network
paths that compromise security.
Test-based approaches aim to provide a proof-of-concept
that a given system vulnerability can be exploited by a
malicious system agent. Black-box fuzz testing is a common
technique used for this purpose (e.g., [22]). Other test-based
approaches look to use static analysis to find potential vulner-
abilities in program code, and then combinations of static and
dynamic analyses to uncover execution paths within the code
for which an exploit can be automatically generated. This is the
idea behind Automatic Exploit Generation (AEG) [23], which
generates evidence that identified security vulnerabilities are
exploitable. However, testing-based techniques such as AEG
and fuzz testing are not easily scalable and are typically only
suited for particular types of systems.
By comparison, the approach proposed in this paper is
targeted at analyzing systems at much earlier stages of de-
velopment. Rather than analyzing program code, we aim to
analyze the specification and design of distributed cyber-
physical systems at a high-level of abstraction. This can allow
for substantial savings in terms of the costs associated with
minimizing cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and recovering from
the effects of a cyber-attack.
D. Models of Information Flow, Dependence, and Causality
Among the most well-known approaches for studying the
interactions of components in complex distributed systems
and networks has been information flow analysis [24]. Many
approaches targeted at modeling and analyzing information
flow with respect to cybersecurity requirements have been
proposed using a variety of formalisms such as state machines
(e.g., [25]), Petri nets (e.g., [26]), process algebras (e.g., [24],
[27]), typing systems (e.g., [28], [29]), and axiomatic ap-
proaches (e.g., [30], [31]). Furthermore, models and notions
of causality, such as those proposed in [32] and [33] have also
provided foundational approaches for studying the dependence
of actions in distributed systems.
Numerous other approaches aimed at formally analyzing
and verifying of concurrent systems (e.g., [34]–[36]), as well
as the formal verification of dynamic and parametrized sys-
tems and networks (e.g., [37], [38]) have also been prosed.
These publications have laid important groundwork for ap-
proaches aimed at providing assurances that systems operate
as expected as they continue to grow in size and complexity.
Although many formalisms and approaches exist for mod-
eling and studying interactions, information flows, and depen-
dencies among components in distributed systems, we propose
an alternative approach meant to aid designers, at early stages
of system development, in systematically evaluating the ways
in which security vulnerabilities in their designs can be ex-
ploited to cause unexpected, and potentially unsafe and inse-
cure, system behaviours. Our approach, based on the C2KA
modeling framework, provides a different and complementary
perspective for studying the interactions of system components
and evaluating the exploitability of security vulnerabilities in
system designs, than what is offered by existing formalisms
and approaches.
III. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce Communicating Con-
current Kleene Algebra and the required preliminaries related
to specifying agents and interactions.
A. Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra
Communicating Concurrent Kleene Algebra (C2KA) [3], [4]
is an algebraic framework for specifying the concurrent and
communicating behaviour of agents in a distributed system.
A C2KA is a mathematical system consisting of a left S-
semimodule
(
S
K,+
)
and a right K-semimodule
(
SK,⊕
)
which characterize how a stimulus structure S and a CKA K
mutually act upon one another to describe the response in-
voked by a stimulus on an agent behaviour as a next behaviour
and a next stimulus.
(
S
K,+
)
describes how the stimulus
structure S acts upon the CKA K via the next behaviour
mapping ◦ and
(
SK,⊕
)
describes how the CKA K acts upon
the stimulus structure S via the next stimulus mapping λ. The
formal definition of a C2KA is given in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (C2KA — e.g., [4]). A C2KA is a system
(
S,K
)
,
where S =
(
S,⊕,⊙, d, n
)
is a stimulus structure and K =(
K,+, ∗, ; , *©, ;©, 0, 1
)
is an atomic CKA such that
(
S
K,+
)
is a unitary and zero-preserving left S-semimodule with next
behaviour mapping ◦ : S×K → K and
(
SK,⊕
)
is a unitary
and zero-preserving right K-semimodule with next stimulus
mapping λ : S × K → S, where the following axioms are
satisfied for all a, b, c ∈ K and s, t ∈ S:
(a) s ◦ (a ; b) = (s ◦ a) ;
(
λ(s, a) ◦ b
)
(b) a ≤K c ∨ b = 1 ∨ (s ◦ a) ;
(
λ(s, c) ◦ b
)
= 0
(c) λ(s⊙ t, a) = λ
(
s, (t ◦ a)
)
⊙ λ(t, a)
(d) s = d ∨ s ◦ 1 = 1
(e) a = 0 ∨ λ(n, a) = n
The reader is referred to the Appendix A for a summary
of the algebraic structures mentioned in this discussion, and
to [3], [4], [39] for a full description of C2KA.
Many complex distributed systems involve intensive com-
munication and exchange with their environment, which often
includes other systems. Consequently, when modeling such
systems, the interactions between the system and its envi-
ronment need to be carefully taken into account [40]. C2KA
allows for the separation of communicating and concurrent
behaviour in a system and its environment and for the expres-
sion of the influence of stimuli on agent behaviours, thereby
providing the capability to model and capture the dynamic
behaviour of complex distributed systems by considering these
important interactions.
1) Atomic Behaviours and Stimuli: For a commutative
monoid
(
S, ·, 1
)
with a, b ∈ S, the divisibility relation div is
defined on S via a div b ⇐⇒ ∃(c | c ∈ S : b = a · c ). An
element a is called a unit if a div 1, and a non-unit otherwise.
A non-unit a is called an atom if a = b ·c implies that either b
or c is a unit. We say that
(
S, ·, 1
)
is atomic if every non-unit
may be factored into atoms in at least one way. Throughout the
remainder of this paper, the set of atomic behaviours will be
denoted by Ka, and the set of atomic stimuli will be denoted
by Sa.
2) Sub-Behaviours and Sub-Stimuli: In general, every
idempotent semiring
(
S,+, ·, 0, 1
)
has a natural partial or-
der ≤ on S defined by a ≤ b ⇐⇒ a + b = b. This means
that associated with a CKA K =
(
K,+, ∗, ; , *©, ;©, 0, 1
)
,
there is an ordering relation ≤K related to the semirings
upon which K is built representing the sub-behaviour relation.
For behaviours a, b ∈ K , a ≤K b indicates that a is a
sub-behaviour of b if and only if a + b = b. Similarly,
associated with a stimulus structure S =
(
S,⊕,⊙, d, n
)
is
an ordering relation ≤S representing the sub-stimulus relation.
For stimuli s, t ∈ S, s ≤S t indicates that s is sub-stimulus of t
if and only if s⊕ t = t. These notions will play an important
role in the attack scenario determination in Section VII-B.
3) Agents: In this paper, the term agent refers to any
system, component, or process whose behaviour consists of
discrete actions [41]. We write A 7→
〈
a
〉
where A is the name
given to an agent and a ∈ K is its behaviour. For A 7→
〈
a
〉
and B 7→
〈
b
〉
, we write A+ B to denote the agent
〈
a + b
〉
.
In a similar way, we can extend the remaining operators on
behaviours of K to their corresponding agents. Thus, agents
are defined by simply describing their behaviour, and for
this reason, we may use the terms agents and behaviours
interchangeably.
4) Specifying Agents using C2KA: C2KA provides three
levels of specification for the behaviour of agents in dis-
tributed systems. The stimulus-response specification of agents
specifies the next behaviour mapping ◦ and next stimulus
mapping λ for each agent. This involves specifying how each
atomic stimulus that can be issued acts upon the atomic
behaviours that each agent can have in the given system. The
abstract behaviour specification specifies each agent behaviour
as a CKA term. This enables the specification of complex
agent behaviours without the need to explicitly articulate the
dependencies between agent behaviours, or to further refine
agent behaviours into state-based specifications. Lastly, the
concrete behaviour specification provides the state-level spec-
ification of each agent behaviour. At this level, the concrete
programs for each of the CKA terms which specify each
agent behaviour are given using any suitable programming or
specification language. In this paper, we use Dijkstra’s guarded
command language [42] for this purpose.
To determine the possible ways that agents in a distributed
system can interact and influence each other’s behaviour,
we need to consider multiple levels of abstraction in the
specification and analysis of the system. These multiple levels
of abstraction correspond to the possibility for agents to com-
municate via stimuli (i.e., message-passing communication)
by considering the stimulus-response and abstract behaviour
specifications, or via shared environments (i.e., via shared vari-
able communication) by considering the concrete behaviour
specifications. For this reason, all three levels of specification
are required for the analysis approach presented in Section VII.
B. Agent Interactions
A distributed system may consist of numerous agents, and
may feature complex agent interactions for synchronizing and
sequencing behaviour, or coordinating access to shared re-
sources, for example. In a distributed system formed by a set A
of agents, agent interactions are represented as sequences of
agents in the following form: pTnn
def
= An →Tn An−1 →Tn−1
. . . →T2 A1 →T1 A0 where each Ai ∈ A for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
and each Tj ∈ {S, E} for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In an agent interac-
tion, →S denotes direct communication via stimuli and →E
denotes direct communication via shared environments. These
notions are discussed in more detail in Sections VI-A and
VI-B. In this way, an interaction pTnn can be written recursively
such that pT1
1
def
= A1 →T1 A0 and p
Tn
n
def
= An →Tn p
Tn−1
n−1 .
The length of an interaction pTnn (denoted |p
Tn
n |) is counted by
the number of direct communications of which it is comprised
(i.e., |pTnn | = n− 1).
Additionally, for an interaction pTnn , we call An the source
agent of the interaction, A0 the sink agent of the interaction,
and each Ai−1 the neighbouring agent of Ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Moreover, when we refer to a compromised agent, we mean
any agent A ∈ A that can behave in a way that is not consistent
with its original or intended specification, meaning that it has
the ability to issue any stimulus s ∈ S and/or alter its concrete
behaviour (e.g., by defining a program variable v in the set of
all program variables in the state space of the system).
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
Distributed systems, where each agent is responsible for
providing some information, or controlling some element of
the system, play a vital role in many critical industries, such
as critical infrastructures, aerospace, automotive, and indus-
trial manufacturing. In this paper, we consider an illustrative
maritime port container terminal coordination system adapted
from [43].
A. Port Terminal Coordination System Description
The port terminal coordination system consists of six classes
of agents, which consist of both cyber components (e.g.,
control software) and physical components. The Port Cap-
tain (PC) decides how the ship will be managed once it
arrives at the port, and initializes the arriving ship’s infor-
mation. The Ship Managers (SMi) are assigned to manage
the loading/unloading of an arriving ship, and for determining
its desired service time. For each Ship Manager, there is an
associated Stevedore (SVi) that is responsible for requesting
cranes and planning the loading/unloading operations for an
arriving ship. The Terminal Manager (TM) allocates the berth
points (i.e., the docking position) for an arriving ship, and
allocates cranes to service a ship based on requests from the
Stevedores. The Crane Manager (CM) is responsible for coor-
dinating the cranes to carry out the loading/unloading sequence
as efficiently as possible. The Carrier Coordinator (CC) is
responsible for managing the straddle carrier positions to aid
in loading/unloading the ship, and moving containers on the
ground of the shipping yard.
When a ship approaches the port, it transmits an arrive
message to begin the port-side operations. The Port Cap-
tain PC responds to the arrive message by determining
how to manage the ship upon its arrival at the port, and
initializing its record of the ship’s information. For the purpose
of illustration in this paper, assume that there are two Ship
Managers SM1 and SM2. This means that there are also two
Stevedores SV1 and SV2 assigned to their corresponding Ship
Managers. Assume that PC non-deterministically chooses to
use SM1 and SV1, or SM2 and SV2 to manage arriving ships.
Based on its choice, PC sends either a mnge1 message or
a mnge2 message to notify the appropriate Ship Manager
that is has been assigned to manage the arriving vessel. In
what follows, we describe the operation of the system in the
case where a mnge1 message is sent. An analogous operation
involving SM2 and SV2 occurs in the event that PC sends
a mnge2 message.
Upon receiving a mnge1 message, Ship Manager SM1
responds by reading the ship information from PC and com-
puting the desired service time according to the following
formula: tservice = tdepart − tarrive − twait. After computing the
desired service time, SM1 issues a ship1 request. Upon receiv-
ing a ship1 request, Stevedore SV1 tries to satisfy the request
by calculating the number of cranes n needed to service the
ship. This calculation is based on the number of containers c,
the desired service time tservice, the average efficiency of the
cranes x (moves per hour), and according to the following
formula: n = c/(x ∗ tservice). Once completed, SV1 sends
a crane1 request.
The Terminal Manager TM responds to the crane1 request
by allocating the berth points for the ship and then allocat-
ing cranes to service the ship. After completing the alloca-
tions, TM issues an allocd message. The waiting SV1 responds
to the allocd message by determining a ship bay allocation
plan based on the crane allocation and berth position. Upon
completion of the plan, SV1 conveys the berth position to SM1
via a berth message. SM1 responds to the berth message
by updating the ship docking position, and issuing a dock
command to notify the ship that it may proceed to dock at the
given berth position. SV1 also responds to the dock command
by recording that the ship is docked and issuing a oper1
command.
The Crane Manager CM responds to the oper1 command
by reading the ship bay plan, determining the containers
that should be loaded/unloaded to each bay, and issuing
a carrier request. The Carrier Coordinator CC responds to
the carrier request by determining the availability of the
straddle carriers, assigning a set of them to service the crane,
and issuing an assgnd message when completed. CM responds
to the assgnd message by determining the loading/unloading
sequence and the position to which a straddle carrier should
be moved. Once completed, CM issues a serve request. CC
responds to the serve request by determining the closest as-
signed straddle carrier and moving it to the requested position.
Once completed, CC issues a served message. CM re-
sponds to the served message by updating the ship bay plan
and carrying out its operations (load/unload). After doing
so, CM issues a done message. The waiting SV1 responds to
the done message by reseting its record of the ship information
and issuing a compl1 message. Upon receiving a compl1
message, TM frees the berth and crane allocations. Also in
response to the compl1 message, SM1 resets its record of the
ship information and sends a deprt1 message. PC responds
to the deprt1 message by freeing the ship manager allocation
and its record of the ship information.
The operation of the port container terminal when us-
ing Ship Manager SM1 can be visualized as shown in the
sequence diagram given in Fig. 1, where the solid arrows
denote message-passing communication (i.e., communication
via stimuli) and the dashed arrows denote shared variable com-
munication (i.e., communication via shared environments).
B. C2KA Specification of the System
To specify the given port terminal coordination system de-
scribed in Section IV-A using C2KA, we first identify the set of
system agents, namely the set A consisting of the agents: {PC,
SM1, SM2, SV1, SV2, TM, CM, CC}. Next, we identify the
set of atomic stimuli that can be issued by the system agents
and the set of atomic behaviours that the agents can exhibit.
These sets are derived from the system description, and are
used to generate the support sets of the stimulus structure S
and the CKA K that comprise the C2KA to be used for the
specification. For the port terminal coordination system, the
set S is generated using the operations of stimulus structures
and the set of atomic stimuli {arrive , mnge1 , mnge2 , ship1 ,
ship2 , crane1 , crane2 , allocd , berth, dock , oper1 , oper2 ,
carrier , assgnd , serve, served , done , compl1 , compl2 ,
deprt1 , deprt2}. Similarly, the set K is generated using the
operations of CKA and the set of atomic behaviours {DEPART,
CLEAR1, CLEAR2, INIT, MAN1, MAN2, SRVT, POSN, LEAVE,
CRANES, PLAN, DOCK, RLSE, ALLO, FREE, READ, CARGO,
Port Captain
(PC)
Ship Manager
(SM1)
Stevedore
(SV1)
Ship Manager
(SM2)
Stevedore
(SV2)
Terminal Manager
(TM)
Crane Manager
(CM)
Carrier Coordinator
(CC)
arrive
mnge1
shipInfo
ship1
shipInfo
crane1
cranes
allocd allocd
berthshipInfo
berth berth
berthPos
dockdock dock
oper1
bayPlan
carrier
containers
assgnd
carrierAssign
serve
position
served
carrierState
done done
compl1compl1
deprt1deprt1
Fig. 1: Intended interactions for the port terminal coordination system when using Ship Manager SM1.
SEQ, SERVE, UPDT, OPER, AVAIL, ASSGN, NEAR, MOVE}.
Lastly, using the constructed C2KA, we develop the three
levels of specification (see Section III-A4) for each agent in
the system.
Using the C2KA constructed above, the stimulus-response
specifications of the port terminal coordination system agents
are compactly specified. The specification shown below de-
picts the stimulus-response specification of the Ship Man-
ager SM1:
berth ◦ SRVT = POSN λ(berth, SRVT) = dock
compl1 ◦ POSN = LEAVE λ(compl1 , POSN) = deprt1
mnge1 ◦ LEAVE = SRVT λ(mnge1 , LEAVE) = ship1
where s ◦ a = a and λ(s, a) = n for all other a ∈ K
and s ∈ S in the C2KA constructed above. Analogous
specifications can be derived for the remaining system agents
and can be found in Appendix C.
Based on the description of the system from Section IV-A,
the abstract behaviour specification of each agent is derived
and shown in Fig. 2.
Finally, we use a fragment of Dijkstra’s guarded command
language [42] to provide the concrete behaviour specification
of each system agent. This involves specifying the concrete
programs corresponding to the abstract behaviour specification
of each agent. Fig. 3 depicts the concrete behaviour spec-
ification of the Ship Manager SM1. Once again, analogous
specifications can be derived for the remaining system agents
and can be found in Appendix C.
PC 7→
〈
(MAN1 + MAN2) ; INIT + (CLEAR1 + CLEAR2) ; DEPART
〉
SMi 7→
〈
SRVT + POSN + LEAVE
〉
SVi 7→
〈
CRANES + PLAN + DOCK + RLSE
〉
TM 7→
〈
ALLO + FREE
〉
CM 7→
〈
READ ; CARGO + SEQ ; SERVE + UPDT ; OPER
〉
CC 7→
〈
AVAIL ; ASSGN + NEAR ;MOVE
〉
Fig. 2: Abstract behaviour specification of the port terminal
coordination system agents.
SRVT
def
= serviceT[1] := departT[1]− arriveT[1]− waitT[1]
POSN
def
= dockPos[1] := berthPos[1]
LEAVE
def
= dockPos[1] := null;serviceT[1] := 0
Fig. 3: Concrete behaviour specification of the Ship Man-
ager SM1 behaviours.
C. Implicit Interactions Present in the System
Given the specification of the port terminal coordination
system, we can identify the implicit interactions that are
present in the system using the approaches presented in [1],
[2]. After performing a full system analysis, it can be shown
that there are 3902 implicit interactions out of the 4596 total
possible system interactions. In particular, the results of the
analysis show that there are 19 implicit interactions from the
Stevedore SV1 to the Stevedore SV2, which are shown in
Fig. 4.
p1
def
= SV1 →E CM→S SV2
p2
def
= SV1 →S CM→S SV2
p3
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→E SM1 →S SV2
p4
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→S SM1 →S SV2
p5
def
= SV1 →E SM1 →S PC→E SV2
p6
def
= SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→E SV2
p7
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→E SV2
p8
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →E SV2
p9
def
= SV1 →E SM1 →S PC→E SM2 →E SV2
p10
def
= SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→E SM2 →E SV2
p11
def
= SV1 →E SM1 →S PC→S SM2 →E SV2
p12
def
= SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→S SM2 →E SV2
p13
def
= SV1 →E TM→E SV2
p14
def
= SV1 →S TM→E SV2
p15
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S SV2
p16
def
= SV1 →E SM1 →S PC→E SM2 →S SV2
p17
def
= SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→E SM2 →S SV2
p18
def
= SV1 →E SM1 →S PC→S SM2 →S SV2
p19
def
= SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→S SM2 →S SV2
Fig. 4: Identified implicit interactions from SV1 to SV2 in the
port terminal coordination system.
Implicit interactions in a system are possible due to the po-
tential for out-of-sequence reads from and/or writes to shared
variables, and/or the potential for out-of-sequence stimuli to
be issued by system agents. This kind of unexpected behaviour
could be the result of agents experiencing some kind of
compromise or failure. As an example, consider the implicit
interaction represented as p7
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S PC →E
SV2. The existence of this implicit interaction indicates that it
is possible for a compromised SV1 to influence the behaviour
of SV2 indirectly via SM2 and PC.
This port terminal coordination system will serve as a
running example throughout the remainder of this paper to
demonstrate the approach for determining the possible attack
scenarios, and for evaluating the exploitability of the subset
of implicit interactions shown in Fig. 4 that are present in
the system. While we present this example within the context
of maritime port operations, the proposed approaches are
applicable in nearly all distributed systems.
V. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
This section provides a high-level overview of the proposed
approach for determining the possible attack scenarios and
assessing the exploitability of implicit interactions. It presents
the main ideas of the proposed approach for readers that wish
to skip the technical details presented in Sections VI–VIII.
A. Highlights of the Proposed Approach
Determining how system agents are capable of influencing
each other’s behaviour is an important part of uncovering
how an implicit interaction can be exploited to mount a
cyber-attack. To make this determination, we first need to
study the potential for communication via stimuli and via
shared environments in a system specified using C2KA. As an
example, consider the Ship Manager SM1 from the port con-
tainer terminal example described in Section IV. To determine
how SM1 can be influenced from the perspective of message-
passing communication, we need to study the potential for
direct communication via stimuli among system agents to
determine the set of stimuli that will cause an observable
change in the behaviour of SM1. Similarly, to determine
how SM1 can be influenced from the perspective of shared
variable communication, we need to study the potential for
direct communication via shared environments to determine
the set of program variables that are referenced in the concrete
behaviour of SM1. In each of these cases, we are looking to
capture the ways in which a compromised agent within the
system can directly influence the behaviour of the agent under
consideration. The formulation of these notions are provided
in Section VI.
Once we have determined how a system agent can be
directly influenced by other agents in a given system, we
need to extend these ideas to determine how an agent can be
indirectly influenced by studying the pattern of communication
dictated by a particular system interaction. Generally speaking,
we are looking to find the stimuli or program variables that a
source agent can use to influence its neighbouring agent in the
interaction so that the neighbouring agent issues a stimulus
or defines a program variable that influences the behaviour
of its neighbouring agent, and so on until the behaviour of
the sink agent is influenced in some way. The idea is to
identify the set of possible scenarios that will cause a kind
of “chain-reaction” through the given implicit interaction. As
an example, consider the implicit interaction represented as
p7
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S PC →E SV2 that was identified in
the port terminal coordination system in Section IV. Since the
interaction dictates that SV1 interacts with SM2 via stimuli
(i.e., SV1 →S SM2), we need to determine the set of stimuli
that can be issued by a compromised SV1 to influence the
behaviour of SM2. However, we must ensure that the resulting
behaviour of SM2, when influenced by SV1, will lead to
the issuance of a stimulus that can influence the behaviour
of PC, since, according to the given interaction, SM2 interacts
with PC via stimuli (i.e., SM2 →S PC). Again, since the
interaction shows that PC interacts with SV2 via shared
environments (i.e., PC →E SV2), it must be ensured that the
resulting behaviour of PC defines a program variable that is
referenced by SV2. Only in this way, will the actions of the
compromised SV1 ultimately influence the behaviour of SV2,
and will the implicit interaction be exploitable. The technical
details and formulation of this approach, which we call attack
scenario determination, can be found in Section VII.
After having determined the set of possible attack scenarios
which allow for an implicit interaction to be exploited in a
given system, we would like to have a measure of the overall
exploitability of the given implicit interaction so that we can
better assess the threat that it may pose to the system. Using
the results of the attack scenario determination, we devise
a new measure of severity for an implicit interaction called
exploitability. The derivation of the exploitability measure
can be found in Section VIII. This new measure of severity
provides a way to compare implicit interactions, as well
as actionable information for system designers to determine
where and how to spend valuable resources in mitigating the
most severe vulnerabilities that exist in their designs. This
insight can offer significant improvements to the overall the
safety, security, and reliability of the system.
As mentioned above, the complete technical details of what
has been presented in this section can be found in Sections VI–
VIII. Readers that wish to forgo those details may skip ahead
to Section IX for a summary of our experimental results and
a discussion of the proposed approach.
B. Tool Support
We use a prototype software tool to support the automated
analysis of the exploitability of implicit interactions present
in distributed systems specified using C2KA. It allows for
the specification of systems using C2KA and automatically
identifies the implicit interactions in a given system. For
this paper, the tool has been extended to also automatically
determine the potential attack scenarios and compute the
exploitability measure for identified implicit interactions. The
tool is implemented in Haskell and uses the Maude term
rewriting system [44].
VI. ANALYZING THE INFLUENCE AND RESPONSE OF
SYSTEM AGENTS
In this section, we formulate and capture the ways in which
an agent can be influenced by another agent by studying the
communication via stimuli and via shared environments in
a system specified using C2KA. Given an implicit interac-
tion identified to exist in a given system, we are interested
in determining the exact stimuli or program variables that
a compromised source agent of the interaction can use to
ultimately influence the behaviour of the sink agent of the in-
teraction thereby causing the system to experience unintended
or unanticipated behaviours. The formulations developed in
this section will be applied in Section VII to determine the
possible attack scenarios for a given implicit interaction. In the
following discussion, we consider a distributed system formed
by a set A of agents with agents A,B ∈ A such that A 6= B.
A. Influencing Stimuli
In a distributed system, stimuli are required to initiate agent
behaviours. As such, we assume that an agent needs to be
influenced by a stimulus before it can issue a stimulus that
might influence the behaviour of another agent. Formally, this
assumption is articulated as (s ◦ a = a) =⇒ (λ(s, a) = n)
for all s ∈ S\{d} and a ∈ K\{0}.
This assumption is motivated by the fact that, in order for
an agent to generate and issue a stimulus (i.e., to send a
message or signal), a concrete program needs to be executed.
As an analogy, consider a system to be an arrangement of
dominoes where each domino represents a system agent. For
a domino to fall over, and potentially cause other dominoes
to fall over, some kind of stimulus (e.g., a push) is required;
a domino cannot simply fall over by itself. This means that
an agent needs some kind of external influence to initiate its
behaviour and execute its programs before it can influence
any other agent(s) in the system. Such external influences may
result from systems outside the boundaries of the system being
considered.
Throughout this paper, when we consider a distributed sys-
tem and its constituent agents, each agent is subjected to each
stimulus that is presented to the system, and every stimulus
invokes a response from an agent. When the behaviour of an
agent changes as a result of the response, we say that the
stimulus influences the behaviour of the agent.
We say that A 7→
〈
a
〉
has the potential for direct commu-
nication via stimuli with B 7→
〈
b
〉
(denoted by A →S B) if
and only if ∃
(
s, t | s, t ∈ Sa ∧ t ≤S λ(s, a) : t ◦ b 6= b
)
where Sa is the set of all atomic stimuli [45]. This means that
if there exists an atomic sub-stimulus that is generated by A
that causes an observable change in the behaviour of B, then
there is a potential for direct communication via stimuli from A
to B. In this way, we can alternatively say that if A →S B,
then there is at least one way in which A can influence the
behaviour of B by communication via stimuli, and that is by
issuing the atomic stimulus t.
However, we are interested in determining all of the possible
ways in which the behaviour of an agent can be influenced
by another agent in the system. By relating the notion of
influence to the formal definition of the potential for direct
communication via stimuli, we determine the set of stimuli
that can influence the behaviour of a given agent.
Definition 2 (Influencing Stimuli). Let
(
S,K
)
be a C2KA.
The influencing stimuli of an agent A 7→
〈
a
〉
with a ∈ K is
the set given by: Infl(A) = {s ∈ Sa | s ◦ a 6= a}.
The influencing stimuli of A is the set of all atomic stimuli
that cause an observable change in the behaviour of A. The
influencing stimuli of an agent can be used to determine how
other agents in the system can directly influence the given
agent’s behaviour. For instance, to directly influence the be-
haviour of A, an agent must issue some stimulus s ∈ Infl(A).
Given a C2KA, it should be noted that since
(
S
K,+
)
is
zero-preserving, every agent behaviour becomes inactive when
subjected to the deactivation stimulus d (i.e., d ◦ a = 0 for
all a ∈ K). This means that every agent, other than the inactive
agent 0, can be influenced by the deactivation stimulus d.
Similarly, since
(
S
K,+
)
is unitary, every agent behaviour
remains unchanged by the neutral stimulus n (i.e., n ◦ a = a
for all a ∈ K). This means that the neutral stimulus n does not
influence the behaviour of any agent. For these reasons, we
exclude these trivial cases when discussing influencing stimuli
in the remainder of this paper.
Example VI.1 (Computing the Influencing Stimuli of an
Agent). Consider the port terminal coordination system
described in Section IV. The set of influencing stimuli
for the Ship Manager SM1 is given by Infl(SM1) =
{berth, compl1 , mnge1}. This means any agent that issues
any of the stimuli berth, compl1 , or mnge1 will influence the
behaviour of SM1. When given the system specification, the
computation of the set of influencing stimuli for a given system
agent can be computed automatically using our prototype
software tool.
An agent A 7→
〈
a
〉
is said to have a fixed point behaviour
if ∀(s | s ∈ S\{d} : s◦a = a ) [4]. This means that a fixed
point behaviour is one that remains unchanged in response to
all stimuli other than the deactivation stimulus d. Proposition 1
shows how an agent with a fixed point behaviour does not have
any non-trivial influencing stimuli.
Proposition 1. If an agent A 7→
〈
a
〉
has a fixed point
behaviour then Infl(A) = ∅.
Proof. The proof is straightforward from the definition of a
fixed point behaviour. The detailed proof can be found in
Appendix B.
As a direct result of Proposition 1, we have Infl(1) = ∅
and Infl(0) = ∅. This means that the idle agent 1 and inactive
agent 0 cannot be influenced by any non-trivial stimuli.
B. Influencing Variables
We say that A 7→
〈
a
〉
has the potential for direct com-
munication via shared environments with B 7→
〈
b
〉
(denoted
by A →E B) if and only if aR b where R is a dependence
relation [45]. In this paper, due to the use of Dijkstra’s guarded
command language for the concrete behaviour specifications
of agents, such a dependence relation is considered to be a
definition-reference relation between program variables. Thus
if there exists a program variable that is defined in the concrete
behaviour specification of A, and referenced in the concrete
behaviour specification of B, then there is a potential for direct
communication via shared environments from A to B.
In what follows, let Def(A) and Ref(A) represent the
sets of program variables that are defined and referenced in
the concrete behaviour specification of agent A, respectively.
These sets can be defined by structural induction on programs
specified with Dijkstra’s guarded command language. We are
interested in determining all of the possible ways in which
the behaviour of an agent can be influenced by another agent
in the system. By relating the notion of influence to the
formal definition of the potential for direct communication
via shared environments, we determine the set of program
variables that can be used to influence the behaviour of an
agent A. We call this set of variables the influencing variables
of A, which is quite simply the set of all program variables
that are referenced in the concrete behaviour specification of A
(i.e., Ref(A)). Therefore, to directly influence the behaviour
of an agent A via shared environments, an agent must define
some variable v ∈ Ref(A).
Example VI.2 (Computing the Influencing Variables of
an Agent). Consider the port terminal coordination sys-
tem described in Section IV. The set of influencing vari-
ables for the Ship Manager SM1 is given by Ref(SM1) =
{arriveT[1], berthPos[1], departT[1], waitT[1]}.
This means any agent that defines any of the variables
arriveT[1], berthPos[1], departT[1], or waitT[1]
will influence the behaviour of SM1. The computation of the
set of influencing variables for a given system agent can also
be computed automatically using our prototype software tool
when given the system specification.
VII. DETERMINING POSSIBLE ATTACK SCENARIOS FOR
IMPLICIT INTERACTIONS
To this point, we have formulated the possible ways in
which an agent can directly influence the behaviour of another
agent in a given system, either via stimuli or via shared
environments. However, implicit interactions are rarely direct
interactions, and therefore, we need to generalize the notions
of influence that have been established in Sections VI-A
and VI-B.
A. Attack Stimuli and Attack Variables
Given an implicit interaction in a system specified using
C2KA, we want to determine the potential ways in which
the interaction can be exploited to mount a cyber-attack. To
achieve this, we consider how a compromised source agent
can exploit the given implicit interaction via stimuli or via
shared environments by examining the pattern of communica-
tion (i.e., the sequence of direct communications via stimuli
and/or shared environments) of the interaction within the given
system. As such, we identify the sets of attack stimuli and
attack variables for a given implicit interaction, which are
defined by mutual recursion in Definitions 3 and 4.
Definition 3 (Attack Stimuli). Given an implicit interaction of
the form pTnn
def
= An →Tn An−1 →Tn−1 . . .→T2 A1 →T1 A0,
the set of stimuli that a compromised source agent An can
issue to exploit the implicit interaction and influence the
behaviour of the sink agent A0 is given by Equation 1
where AV
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
denotes the set of attack variables for p
Tn−1
n−1
as defined in Definition 4.
Definition 3 describes the set of stimuli that a compromised
source agent can issue to influence the behaviour of the
sink agent of a given implicit interaction. To exploit a direct
interaction via stimuli (pS1
def
= A1 →S A0), a compromised
source agent A1 needs to issue any stimulus that influences
the sink agent A0. Similarly, to exploit an implicit interaction
of the form (pSn
def
= An →S p
Tn−1
n−1 ), a compromised source
agent An needs to issue any atomic stimulus s for which
there exists an atomic sub-behaviour a of its neighbouring
agent An−1 that is influenced by s and either:
(a) the atomic sub-behaviour a under s generates a stimulus
that exploits the rest of the given interaction denoted
by p
Tn−1
n−1 ; or
AS
(
pTnn
)
=


Infl(A0) if Tn = S ∧ n = 1{
s | ∃
(
a | a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K An−1 ∧ s ∈ Infl(a) :
∃(v |: v ∈ Def(s ◦ a) ∩ AV
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
) ∨ λ(s, a) ∈ AS
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
) )}
if Tn = S ∧ n > 1
∅ otherwise
(1)
AV
(
pTnn
)
=


Ref(A0) if Tn = E ∧ n = 1{
v | ∃
(
a | a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K An−1 ∧ v ∈ Ref(a) :
∃(w |: w ∈ Def(a) ∩ AV
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
) ∨ ∃(s | s ∈ Sa : λ(s, a) ∈ AS
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
)
)}
if Tn = E ∧ n > 1
∅ otherwise
(2)
(b) there is a program variable v that is defined by the
resulting behaviour of a under s that can exploit the rest
of the given interaction denoted by p
Tn−1
n−1 .
Definition 3 also shows that for any implicit interaction of
the form An →E p
Tn−1
n−1 then AS
(
pTnn
)
= ∅. This follows
from intuition since direct interactions via shared environments
(i.e., An →E An−1) are exploited only by defining program
variables.
Definition 4 (Attack Variables). Given an implicit interaction
of the form pTnn
def
= An →Tn An−1 →Tn−1 . . . →T2 A1 →T1
A0, the set of variables that a compromised source agent An
can define to exploit the implicit interaction and influence
the behaviour of the sink agent A0 is given by Equation 2
where AS
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
denotes the set of attack stimuli for p
Tn−1
n−1
as defined in Definition 3.
Definition 4 describes the set of program variables that
a compromised source agent can define to influence the
behaviour of the sink agent of a given implicit interaction. To
exploit a direct interaction via shared environments (pE1
def
=
A1 →E A0), a compromised source agent A1 needs to define
any variable referenced by the sink agent A0. Likewise, to
exploit an implicit interaction of the form (pEn
def
= An →E
p
Tn−1
n−1 ), a compromised source agent An needs to define any
program variable referenced by an atomic sub-behaviour a of
its neighbouring agent An−1 and for which either:
(a) there is a program variable w that is defined by the atomic
sub-behaviour a that can exploit the rest of the given
interaction denoted by p
Tn−1
n−1 ; or
(b) there is an atomic stimulus s for which the atomic sub-
behaviour a under s generates a stimulus that exploits the
rest of the given interaction denoted by p
Tn−1
n−1 .
Similar to Definition 3, Definition 4 also shows that for any im-
plicit interaction of the form An →S p
Tn−1
n−1 then AV
(
pTnn
)
=
∅. Once again, this follows from intuition since direct inter-
actions via stimuli (i.e., An →S An−1) are exploited only by
issuing stimuli.
When determining the attack stimuli and attack variables
for the purpose of determining the possible attack scenarios
for implicit interactions in Definitions 3 and 4, we need to
consider the existence of an atomic sub-behaviour of the
neighbouring agent of An (i.e., a ≤K An−1) to ensure that
it is indeed possible for An−1 to subsequently influence the
behaviour of its neighbouring agent.
As one example of this situation, consider an implicit
interaction of the form A3 →E A2 →E A1 →E A0
with A2 7→
〈
a1 + a2
〉
such that a1, a2 ∈ Ka and
the concrete behaviour specifications are given by a1
def
=
u := v + 1 and a2
def
= y := x + 1; w := z. There-
fore, Def(A2) = {u, y, w} and Ref(A2) = {v, x, z}. Now
suppose that AV
(
pT1
1
)
= {y, w}. By applying Definition 4,
we compute AV
(
pT2
2
)
= {v, x, z}. However, while defining v
will influence the behaviour of A2 (namely a1), it will not sub-
sequently influence the behaviour of its neighbouring agent A1
since v /∈ AV
(
pT1
1
)
. This means that A2 will only be able to
influence the behaviour of A1 if it behaves as the atomic sub-
behaviour a2. Similar cases can be constructed for implicit
interactions of different forms.
B. Attack Scenario Determination
By combining the definitions of the sets of attack stimuli and
attack variables, we obtain a generalized formulation of the set
of possible attack scenarios for a given implicit interaction in
a distributed system specified using C2KA.
Definition 5 (Attack Scenario Determination). Given an im-
plicit interaction of the form pTnn
def
= An →Tn An−1 →Tn−1
. . . →T2 A1 →T1 A0, the set of possible attack scenarios by
which a compromised source agent An can exploit the implicit
interaction and influence the behaviour of the sink agent A0
is given by: attack
(
pTnn
)
= AS
(
pTnn
)
∪ AV
(
pTnn
)
.
By Definition 5, the set of possible attack scenarios for a
given implicit interactions is either the set of attack stimuli
or the set of attack variables for the interaction. This is
due to the fact that the pattern of communication needs to
be respected when exploiting the implicit interaction. This
means that the source agent can only influence its immediate
neighbour according the type of communication (either via
stimuli or shared environments) dictated by the interaction.
Consequently, for any given interaction pTnn , attack
(
pTnn
)
is
either a subset of atomic stimuli or a subset of program
variables, depending on the way in which the source agent
communicates with its neighbouring agent. This is a direct
result from Definitions 3 and 4, and the fact that for any
implicit interaction pTnn : if Tn = S then AV
(
pTnn
)
= ∅, and
if Tn = E then AS
(
pTnn
)
= ∅.
Example VII.1 (Computing the Possible Attack Scenarios of
Implicit Interactions). Consider the port terminal coordination
system described in Section IV and the implicit interaction
represented as p7
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S PC →E SV2.
By direct application of Definitions 3–5, the set of possi-
ble attack scenarios is given by attack
(
p7
)
= {compl2}.
This shows that to exploit the given implicit interaction, a
compromised SV1 can send a compl2 message, which can
cause SM2 to enter its leaving behaviour (LEAVE) and send
a deprt2 message. In turn, this can cause PC to clear the
ship information which is needed by SV2, and can therefore
disrupt the port operations.
As another example, consider the implicit interaction
represented as p13
def
= SV1 →E TM →E SV2. In
this case, the set of possible attack scenarios is given
by attack
(
p13
)
= {berth[1], berth[2], numCranes[1],
numCranes[2]}. This shows that a compromised SV1 can
exploit the given implicit interaction by modifying any, or
all, of the variables berth[1], berth[2], numCranes[1],
and/or numCranes[2], which are used by TM to determine
the crane allocations. This means that when TM references
these variables, it can determine incorrect crane allocations.
Therefore, once SV2 enters its planning behaviour (PLAN),
it may use the incorrect crane allocations, which can also
disrupt the port operations.
Using our prototype software tool, we can automatically
compute the set of possible attack scenarios for an implicit
interaction when given the system specification. A selection
of the results of the tool output are summarized in Table I in
Section IX.
It should be noted that if attack
(
pSn
)
= ∅ for any implicit
interaction of the form pSn , then the implicit interaction can
only be exploited trivially. As mentioned in Section VI-A,
every agent other than the inactive agent 0 can be influenced
by the deactivation stimulus d. Therefore, if attack
(
pSn
)
= ∅,
then pSn can only be exploited by issuing the deactivation
stimulus d, which will ultimately cause the sink agent to
behave as the inactive agent 0. Furthermore, if attack
(
pEn
)
= ∅
for any implicit interaction of the form pEn, then the implicit
interaction cannot be exploited. While it is the case that there is
a potential for direct communication via shared environments
from An to An−1 which allows for the identification of p
E
n as
an implicit interaction, the attack scenario determination shows
that there is no way in which a compromised agent An can
create a chain of influence to ultimately affect the behaviour of
sink agent A0. As an example, consider the implicit interaction
represented as p11
def
= SV1 →E SM1 →S PC →S SM2 →E
SV2 for which attack
(
p11
)
= ∅. By carefully examining the
attack scenarios, we find that in order to exploit this implicit
interaction, SV1 must define any program variable that is
referenced by an atomic sub-behaviour of SM1 for which there
is an atomic stimulus that will generate a stimulus that can
exploit the rest of the given interaction (i.e., SM1 →S PC→S
SM2 →E SV2), which in this case is the arrive stimulus.
However, because there does not exist any behaviour in the
port terminal coordination system that can generate the arrive
stimulus (it is an external stimulus), there does not exist any
variable that SV1 can define to cause the chain of influence to
ultimately affect the behaviour of SV2 via the given implicit
interaction.
Proposition 2 shows that if there are no attack scenarios for
any suffix of an implicit interaction pTnn , then there is no way
to exploit pTnn apart from the trivial cases as described above.
Proposition 2. Let pTnn be an implicit interaction. Then,
attack
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
= ∅ =⇒ attack
(
pTnn
)
= ∅ where Ti ∈
{S, E} for 1 < i ≤ n.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from Definition 3,
Definition 4, and Definition 5. The detailed proof can be found
in Appendix B.
The result of Proposition 2 enables us to determine the
attack scenarios for the given implicit interaction without the
need to analyze the entire interaction. In cases where a given
implicit interaction is long, which is possible in systems with
a large numbers of interacting agents, this result allows for
savings in terms of the time required to perform the attack
scenario determination.
VIII. EVALUATING THE EXPLOITABILITY OF IMPLICIT
INTERACTIONS
After performing the attack scenario determination for each
of the identified implicit interactions in a given system design,
we use the set of possible attack scenarios to develop a new
measure of the severity of each interaction. The severity of
an implicit interaction gives an indication of the interactions
that have the potential to most negatively impact the safety,
security, and/or reliability of the system in which they exist.
We call this new measure of severity, the exploitability of the
implicit interaction and compute it as prescribed by Defini-
tion 6.
Definition 6 (Exploitability). The exploitability of an implicit
interaction pTnn (denoted ξ
(
pTnn
)
) is computed recursively by:
ξ
(
pTnn
)
=


ξ
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
) |Infl(An−1) ∩ attack
(
pTnn
)
|
|Infl(An−1)|
if Tn = S ∧ n > 1
ξ
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
) |Ref(An−1) ∩ attack
(
pTnn
)
|
|Ref(An−1)|
if Tn = E ∧ n > 1
1 otherwise
Definition 6 computes the fraction of ways that a source
agent can influence the behaviour of its neighbouring agent in
a way that the influence is propagated along the implicit inter-
action to eventually influence the behaviour of the sink agent.
The exploitability of an implicit interaction interaction pTnn
is a numeric value ξ
(
pTnn
)
such that 0 ≤ ξ
(
pTnn
)
≤ 1. In
each fractional component of the exploitability measure, the
denominator represents the total number of ways in which
the behaviour of the next agent in the interaction can be
influenced, and the numerator represents the number of those
ways that will maintain the chain of influence for the given
the implicit interaction, thereby allowing for its exploitation.
Definition 6 shows that the exploitability of direct inter-
actions is always equal to 1. This follows from intuition,
and directly from Definition 5, since any attack scenario for
a direct interaction will influence the behaviour of the sink
agent. In the recursive cases, we compute the product of the
exploitability of each proper subpath of the given implicit
interaction. This allows us to account for the fact that an
indirect implicit interaction requires that each intermediate
agent propagate the influence to its neighbouring agent. This
means that for an implicit interaction that contains a large
number of intermediate agents, a compromised source agent
needs to rely on a number of additional agents to influence
the sink agent’s behaviour. Intuitively, the fewer possibilities
that each agent in an implicit interaction has to cause a “chain
reaction” of influence in its neighbouring agents, the lower
the exploitability of interaction. In this way, the lower the
exploitability measure for an implicit interaction, the more
narrow the possibilities for exploiting the interaction.
Note that for an implicit interaction pTnn , the exploitability
measure is always defined because it is the case that Infl(Ai) 6=
∅ if Ti = S and Ref(Ai) 6= ∅ if Ti = E for all Ai in p
Tn
n
and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This follows from the definition of an
implicit interaction as a sequence of direct communications
either via stimuli or shared environments (see Sections VI-A
and VI-B). For an implicit interaction to exist, there must be
at least one stimulus or program variable that can influence
each neighbouring agent in the interaction (i.e., a potential for
direct communication). For instance, an implicit interaction of
the form A2 →S A1 →E A0 is only possible if there exists
some stimulus issued by A2 that influences A1 (i.e., ∃(s |:
s ∈ Infl(A1) )), and some program variable defined by A1 that
is referenced by A0 (i.e., ∃(v |: v ∈ Ref(A0) )).
Consider the port terminal coordination system described in
Section IV and the implicit interaction represented as p7
def
=
SV1 →S SM2 →S PC →E SV2. By applying Definition 6,
the exploitability of p7 is computed to be 0.222. This is due
to the fact that, of the three stimuli that will influence the
behaviour of SM2, only one (namely compl2 ) will allow SM2
to, in turn, influence the behaviour of PC, and ultimately the
rest of the agents in the given interaction. Similarly, of the
three stimuli that will influence the behaviour of PC, only
two (namely deprt1 and deprt2 ) will allow PC to influence
the behaviour of SV2.
The exploitability of an implicit interaction can be computed
automatically using our prototype software tool when given
the system specification. We refer the reader to Table I in
Section IX for a selection of results from the tool output.
Example VIII.1 (Computing the Exploitability of an Implicit
Interaction). Consider the port terminal coordination system
described in Section IV and the implicit interaction represented
as p7
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →S PC →E SV2. By applying
Definition 6, the exploitability of p7 is computed to be 0.222.
ξ
(
SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→E SV2
)
= ξ
(
SM2 →S PC→E SV2
)
∗
|Infl(SM2) ∩ attack
(
SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→E SV2
)
|
|Infl(SM2)|
= ξ
(
PC→E SV2
)
∗
|Infl(PC) ∩ attack
(
SM2 →S PC→E SV2
)
|
|Infl(PC)|
∗
|Infl(SM2) ∩ attack
(
SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→E SV2
)
|
|Infl(SM2)|
= 1 ∗
|{arrive, deprt1 , deprt2} ∩ {deprt1 , deprt2 ,mnge1 ,mnge2}|
|{arrive, deprt1 , deprt2}|
∗
|{berth, compl2 ,mnge2} ∩ {compl2 }|
|{berth, compl2 ,mnge2}|
= 1 ∗
|{deprt1 , deprt2}|
|{arrive, deprt1 , deprt2}|
∗
|{compl2 }|
|{berth, compl2 ,mnge2}|
= 1 ∗
2
3
∗
1
3
= 0.222
This shows that, of the three stimuli that will influence the
behaviour of SM2, only one (namely compl2 ) will allow SM2
to, in turn, influence the behaviour of PC, and ultimately the
rest of the agents in the given interaction. Similarly, of the
three stimuli that will influence the behaviour of PC, only two
(namely deprt1 and deprt2 ) will allow PC to influence the
behaviour of SV2. The exploitability of an implicit interaction
can be computed automatically with the help of our prototype
software tool when given the system specification. We refer the
reader to Table I in Section IX for a selection of results from
the tool output.
It is important to note that we are determining and measur-
ing the possible ways in which an attacker can use an implicit
interaction to influence the behaviour of an agent in a given
system, regardless of the impact that such an influence can
have on the overall system behaviour. Not all of the ways
in which an attacker may exploit an implicit interaction are
“created equal,” and we do not rule out the fact that some
ways may be more likely to be used by an attacker than others,
for a number of reasons. Because of this, we acknowledge
that the study of the potential impact that particular exploits
of existing implicit interactions in system designs can have
on the overall system behaviour and operation is critically
important, however it is a significant effort in its own right and
is out of the scope of this paper. Rather, we conjecture that
the information generated from the proposed attack scenario
determination and exploitability analysis can provide vital
information for studying the potential impact of cyber-attacks
launched through implicit interactions and is the subject of our
future work.
IX. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we summarize our experimental results
for determining the possible attack scenarios and evaluating
the exploitability of implicit interactions identified in our
illustrative port terminal coordination system. We also provide
a discussion of the results and the proposed approach.
A. Experimental Results
Using our developed prototype software tool, we compute
the attack scenario determination and the exploitability of
each of the identified implicit interactions from SV1 to SV2
(see Section IV-C and Fig. 4). The experimental results are
summarized in Table I. A similar analysis can be performed
for the remaining implicit interactions identified in the system.
Due to space limitations, we do not present the analysis of the
entire system here.
When comparing the exploitability of the given implicit
interactions that have been identified to exist in the port
terminal coordination system with a source agent SV1 and
a sink agent SV2, we find a variation in the results for each
of the interactions. An interaction with a higher exploitability
shows that there are more ways in which a compromised
source agent can influence the behaviour of the sink agent.
This means that such interactions present a higher probability
that the source agent can mount a cyber-attack on the given
interaction and ultimately influence the behaviour of the sink
agent. This analysis aids in validating the existence of the
implicit interactions within the system, and provides system
designers with plenty of insight into identifying, assessing, and
mitigating deficiencies in their designs.
Table I shows that the exploitability measure for some im-
plicit interactions (e.g., p13 and p14) is 1.0. This indicates that
these implicit interactions are maximally exploitable, meaning
that as long as a compromised source agent influences the
behaviour of its neighbouring agent, then it will ultimately
influence the behaviour of the sink agent. As such, this makes
the compromised source agent very powerful in being able to
conduct a cyber-attack within the system. Consequently, these
particular implicit interactions present the most serious threat
to the safety, security, and reliability of the system and ought
to be assigned the highest priority for mitigation.
Conversely, some implicit interactions (e.g., p4, p11, p12,
p18 and p19) have an exploitability measure of 0.0. In the
case of p4, p12, and p19, the results show that these implicit
interactions can only be exploited trivially, as discussed in
Section VII-B, by having the compromised source agent issue
a deactivation stimulus d. In this way, these interactions pose
little threat to the system since this very specific and trivial
way to exploit the interaction is straightforward to monitor
and mitigate. Similarly, in the case of p11 and p18, the results
show that these implicit interactions cannot be exploited in the
given system. Therefore, these interactions can be considered
benign, which is very useful for the system designers when
they need to determine where and how to focus their efforts in
mitigating the existence of implicit interactions in their system
designs.
In addition to the special cases discussed above, Table I
also shows that there are a number of implicit interactions
with exploitability measures that fall in between the two
extremes of not exploitable (i.e., ξ
(
pEn
)
= 0.0), or trivially
exploitable (i.e., ξ
(
pSn
)
= 0.0), and maximally exploitable
(i.e., ξ
(
pTnn
)
= 1.0 for Tn ∈ {S, E}). For example, the
implicit interaction p8
def
= SV1 →S SM2 →E SV2 has an
exploitability of 0.667. This indicates there is a 66.7% chance
that a compromised SV1 can influence the behaviour of SM2
in such a way that it will ultimately result in an influence of the
behaviour of the sink agent SV2. Furthermore, when compared
with the implicit interaction p1
def
= SV1 →E CM →S SV2
which has an exploitability of 0.333 (half of that of p8), we
can say that p8 is twice as exploitable as p1. The ability
to compare the relative exploitability between two or more
implicit interactions can help system designers in determining
which implicit interactions found to exist in their designs
should be mitigated with the highest priority.
More broadly, the illustrative example of the port terminal
coordination system and our experimental results show that
despite having two seemingly unconnected components (e.g.,
the Stevedores SV1 and SV2), there is a possibility for one to
influence the behaviour of the other. The proposed approach
allows us to determine the precise ways in which this is
possible with respect to a given system specification. As our
experimental results show, in some cases, a compromised
source agent requires a very specific scenario to exploit an
implicit interaction to influence the behaviour of the sink
agent, and in other cases, there is much more freedom and
possibility for exploitation.
B. Discussion of the Proposed Approach
The proposed approach for determining the ways in which
implicit interactions can be exploited to mount a cyber-attack
provides a step towards validating the existence of implicit
interactions in the designs of distributed systems. This infor-
mation is critical in assessing the severity of the vulnerabilities,
as well as in determining where and how to spend valuable
resources in mitigating the potential for such attacks. In turn,
this enables system designers, early in the system development
life-cycle, to more accurately assess the threat that such vul-
nerabilities pose to the overall safety, security, and reliability
of the system if left unmitigated. Furthermore, the proposed
approach can aid in developing guidelines for designing and
implementing resilient distributed systems. For example, it can
help designers to rework their system designs to eliminate or
mitigate the identified vulnerability and/or to aid in selecting
appropriate security and reliability controls (such as strict input
validations) to be implemented to prevent any exploits or
attacks of vulnerabilities that cannot be completely eliminated.
Although any sufficiently general model would allow study-
ing interactions between components and their relationship to
certain classes of properties, our approach using the C2KA
modeling framework takes advantage of the capability of
C2KA to separate the behaviour of a system and its en-
vironment, and to deterministically ascertain the potential
attack scenarios for both communication via stimuli (message-
passing communication) and communication via shared en-
vironments (shared variable communication); something that
cannot be done directly using other approaches. The moderate
effort required to model a given system using C2KA (i.e., to
develop the formal specification of the system) is outweighed
TABLE I: Experimental results of the attack scenario determination and exploitability analysis for the identified implicit
interactions from SV1 to SV2; a higher exploitability measure indicates a higher threat in the system.
ID Implicit Interaction Attack Scenarios: attack
(
pi
)
Exploitability: 0 ≤ ξ
(
pi
)
≤ 1
p1 SV1 →E CM →S SV2 {plan,sequence} 0.333
p2 SV1 →S CM →S SV2 {served} 0.250
p3 SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→E SM1 →S SV2 {compl2 } 0.167
p4 SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→S SM1 →S SV2 ∅ 0.000
p5 SV1 →E SM1 →S PC →E SV2 {berthPos[1]} 0.167
p6 SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→E SV2 {compl1 } 0.222
p7 SV1 →S SM2 →S PC→E SV2 {compl2 } 0.222
p8 SV1 →S SM2 →E SV2 {compl2 ,mnge2} 0.667
p9 SV1 →E SM1 →S PC →E SM2 →E SV2 {berthPos[1]} 0.125
p10 SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→E SM2 →E SV2 {compl1 } 0.167
p11 SV1 →E SM1 →S PC →S SM2 →E SV2 ∅ 0.000
p12 SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→S SM2 →E SV2 ∅ 0.000
p13 SV1 →E TM →E SV2 {berth[1],berth[2],numCranes[1],numCranes[2]} 1.000
p14 SV1 →S TM →E SV2 {compl1 , compl2 , crane1 , crane2} 1.000
p15 SV1 →S SM2 →S SV2 {berth,mnge2} 0.667
p16 SV1 →E SM1 →S PC →E SM2 →S SV2 {berthPos[1]} 0.125
p17 SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→E SM2 →S SV2 {compl1 } 0.167
p18 SV1 →E SM1 →S PC →S SM2 →S SV2 ∅ 0.000
p19 SV1 →S SM1 →S PC→S SM2 →S SV2 ∅ 0.000
by the natural formalization of the notions of the attack
scenario determination and exploitability as presented in this
paper. Furthermore, it provides the ability to perform other
kinds of analyses (e.g., model-checking, simulations, etc.) on
the C2KA specifications, including those outside of the realm
of implicit interactions.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
Implicit interactions are previously unknown linkages
among system components indicating the presence of cyber-
security vulnerabilities that, if exploited, can have serious
consequences with respect to the safety, security, and relia-
bility of a system. In this paper, we presented a systematic
approach for evaluating the exploitability of implicit interac-
tions in distributed systems. The approach is based on attack
scenario determination, which finds the set of possible ways
in which a compromised system agent can exploit a particular
implicit interaction to mount a cyber-attack that influences
the behaviour of other agents in the system. This is done
by studying the influence and response of the system agents
and their C2KA specifications. We have also developed a
new measure of exploitability for implicit interactions, which
provides critical information that can offer useful insights to
system designers when determining measures to mitigate the
potential for implicit interactions to be exploited in a cyber-
attack. In addition, we reported on a prototype tool that aids
in the automated analysis, and demonstrates the feasibility and
practicality of the proposed approach for analyzing systems of
reasonable size and complexity. Broadly speaking, the rigorous
and practical techniques presented in this paper enable better
identification and assessment of cybersecurity vulnerabilities
in system designs which can improve overall system resilience,
dependability, and security.
While we have shown that there are specific scenarios
by which an implicit implicit interaction can be exploited,
and that there are varying degrees of exploitability, a further
examination and assessment of the impact that a potential
cyber-attack can have on a system is needed. For example,
while it may be the case that an implicit interaction is highly
exploitable, it is possible that the resulting system behaviour
from an attack may not lead to a critical system state that
is cause for serious concern. As such, in future work, we
plan to develop analysis methods based on simulations of
cyber-attacks launched upon implicit interactions using the
attack scenarios determined by the proposed approach, to study
their potential effects and impacts on the given systems and
their operations. The results of these simulations and impact
analyses will provide actionable information on where to focus
efforts and resources on reducing the risk and impact of such
attacks.
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EVALUATING THE EXPLOITABILITY OF IMPLICIT INTERACTIONS IN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
APPENDIX A
ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES
This appendix summarizes the relevant algebraic structures discussed in the paper.
1) A monoid is a mathematical structure
(
S, ·, 1
)
where S is a nonempty set, · is an associative binary operation and 1 is
the identity with respect to · (i.e., a · 1 = 1 · a = a for all a ∈ S).
• A monoid is called commutative if · is commutative (i.e., a · b = b · a for all a, b ∈ S).
• A monoid is called idempotent if · is idempotent (i.e., a · a = a for all a ∈ S).
2) A semiring is a mathematical structure
(
S,+, ·, 0, 1
)
where
(
S,+, 0
)
is a commutative monoid and
(
S, ·, 1
)
is a monoid
such that · distributes over + (i.e., a · (b+ c) = a · b+ a · c and (a+ b) · c = a · c+ b · c for all a, b, c ∈ S).
• Element 0 is called multiplicatively absorbing if it annihilates S with respect to · (i.e., a ·0 = 0 ·a = 0 for all a ∈ S).
• A semiring is called idempotent if + is idempotent.
• Every idempotent semiring has a partial order ≤ on S defined by a ≤ b ⇐⇒ a+ b = b.
3) A Kleene algebra is a mathematical structure
(
K,+, ·, ∗, 0, 1
)
where
(
K,+, ·, 0, 1
)
is an idempotent semiring with a
multiplicatively absorbing 0 and identity 1, and where the following axioms are satisfied for all a, b, c ∈ K:
a) 1 + a · a∗ = a∗
b) 1 + a∗ · a = a∗
c) b+ a · c ≤ c =⇒ a∗ · b ≤ c
d) b+ c · a ≤ c =⇒ b · a∗ ≤ c
4) Let S =
(
S,⊕,⊙, 0S, 1S
)
be a semiring and K =
(
K,+, 0K
)
be a commutative monoid. We call
(
S
K,+
)
a left S-
semimodule if there exists a mapping ◦ : S ×K → K such that for all s, t ∈ S and a, b ∈ K:
a) s ◦ (a+ b) = s ◦ a+ s ◦ b
b) (s⊕ t) ◦ a = s ◦ a+ t ◦ a
c) (s⊙ t) ◦ a = s ◦ (t ◦ a)
d)
(
S
K,⊕
)
is unitary if also 1S ◦ a = a
e)
(
S
K,⊕
)
is zero-preserving if also 0S ◦ a = 0K
• An analogous right K-semimodule corresponding is denoted by
(
SK,⊕
)
. In this paper, we use λ : S × K → S to
denote the semimodule mapping for
(
SK,⊕
)
.
5) A concurrent Kleene algebra (CKA) is a mathematical structure
(
K,+, ∗, ; , *©, ;©, 0, 1
)
such that
(
K,+, ∗, *©, 0, 1
)
and
(
K,+, ; , ;©, 0, 1
)
are Kleene algebras linked by the exchange axiom (a ∗ b) ; (c ∗ d) ≤ (b ; c) ∗ (a ; d).
• K represents a set of possible behaviours.
• + is a choice of two behaviours.
• ; is a sequential composition of two behaviours.
• ∗ is a concurrent composition of two behaviours.
•
;© is a finite sequential iteration of a behaviour.
• *
© is a finite concurrent iteration of a behaviour.
• 0 represents the behaviour of the inactive agent.
• 1 represents the behaviour of the idle agent.
6) A stimulus structure S
def
=
(
S,⊕,⊙, d, n
)
is an idempotent semiring with a multiplicatively absorbing d and identity n.
• S is the set of stimuli which may be introduced in a system.
• ⊕ is a choice of two stimuli.
• ⊙ is a sequential composition of two stimuli.
• d represents the deactivation stimulus which influences all agents to become inactive.
• n represents the neutral stimulus which has no influence on the behaviour of all agents.
7) A dependence relation on a set K with operator + is a bilinear relation R ⊆ K ×K (i.e.,
[
(a + b)R c ⇐⇒ (aR c ∨
bR c)
]
and
[
aR(b+ c) ⇐⇒ (aR b ∨ aR c)
]
for all a, b, c ∈ S).
• If aR b, we say that b depends on a.
APPENDIX B
DETAILED PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
A. Detailed Proof of Proposition 1
Let A 7→
〈
a
〉
be an agent such that a is a fixed point behaviour (i.e., ∀(s | s ∈ S\{d} : s ◦ a = a )). Then, Infl(A) = ∅.
Infl(A) = ∅
⇐⇒ 〈 Definition 2 〉
{s ∈ Sa | s ◦ a 6= a} = ∅
⇐= 〈 Hypothesis: a is a fixed point & Sa ⊆ S 〉
{s ∈ Sa | false} = ∅
⇐⇒ 〈 Empty Set Axiom & Reflexivity of = 〉
true
B. Detailed Proof of Proposition 2
Let pTnn be an implicit interaction. Then, attack
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
= ∅ =⇒ attack
(
pTnn
)
= ∅ where Ti ∈ {S, E} for 1 < i ≤ n.
attack
(
pTnn
)
= ∅
⇐⇒ 〈 Definition 5 〉
AS
(
pTnn
)
∪ AV
(
pTnn
)
= ∅
⇐⇒ 〈 Definition 3 & Definition 4 〉{
s | ∃
(
a | a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K Xn−1 ∧ s ∈ Infl(a) : λ(s, a) ∈ AS
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
∨ ∃(v |: v ∈ Def(a) ∩
AV
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
)
)}
∪
{
v | ∃
(
a | a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K Xn−1 ∧ v ∈ Ref(a) : ∃(w |: w ∈ Def(a) ∩ AV
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
) ∨
∃(s | s ∈ Sa : λ(s, a) ∈ AS
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
)
)}
= ∅
⇐= 〈 Hypothesis: attack
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
= ∅ =⇒ AS
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
= ∅ ∧ AV
(
p
Tn−1
n−1
)
= ∅ 〉{
s | ∃
(
a | a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K Xn−1 ∧ s ∈ Infl(a) : λ(s, a) ∈ ∅ ∨ ∃(v |: v ∈ Def(a) ∩ ∅ )
)}
∪
{
v | ∃
(
a |
a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K Xn−1 ∧ v ∈ Ref(a) : ∃(w |: w ∈ Def(a) ∩ ∅ ) ∨ ∃(s | s ∈ Sa : λ(s, a) ∈ ∅ )
)}
= ∅
⇐⇒ 〈 Zero of ∩ & Empty Set Membership 〉{
s | ∃
(
a | a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K Xn−1 ∧ s ∈ Infl(a) : false ∨ ∃(v |: false )
)}
∪
{
v | ∃
(
a | a ∈ Ka ∧ a ≤K
Xn−1 ∧ v ∈ Ref(a) : ∃(w |: false ) ∨ ∃(s | s ∈ Sa : false )
)}
= ∅
⇐⇒ 〈 ∃-False Body & Identity of ∨ 〉{
s | false
}
∪
{
v | false
}
= ∅
⇐⇒ 〈 Empty Set Axiom & Reflexivity of = 〉
true
APPENDIX C
C2KA SPECIFICATION OF THE PORT TERMINAL COORDINATION SYSTEM
This appendix contains the complete specification of the port terminal coordination system described in Section IV.
A. System Agents
The port terminal coordination system consists of the following eight agents:
PC Port Captain SM1 Ship Manager 1 SM2 Ship Manager 2
TM Terminal Manager SV1 Stevedore 1 SV2 Stevedore 2
CM Crane Manager CC Carrier Coordinator
B. Stimulus Structure
The set of stimuli S is generated using the operations of stimulus structures and the following set of 21 atomic
stimuli: {arrive , mnge1 , mnge2 , ship1 , ship2 , crane1 , crane2 , allocd , berth , dock , oper1 , oper2 , carrier , assgnd , serve ,
served , done , compl1 , compl2 , deprt1 , deprt2}.
C. Behavior (CKA) Structure
The set of agent behaviours K is generated using the operations of CKA and the following set of 25 atomic be-
haviours: {DEPART, CLEAR1, CLEAR2, INIT, MAN1, MAN2, SRVT, POSN, LEAVE, CRANES, PLAN, DOCK, RLSE, ALLO,
FREE, READ, CARGO, SEQ, SERVE, UPDT, OPER, AVAIL, ASSGN, NEAR, MOVE}.
D. Stimulus-Response Specifications of Agents
The stimulus-response specifications for the system agents are provided in a tabular format as shown in Tables I–VIII.
While the stimulus-response specifications of the system agents specifies a single next behaviour mapping ◦ and next stimulus
mapping λ, they are presented as separate tables for each agent to improve the readability and reviewability of the specifications.
For each table, the row header shows the atomic behaviours that the given agent can exhibit as dictated by the abstract behaviour
specification of the agent and the C2KA. The column header shows the atomic stimuli to which the agent may be subjected.
The table grid provides the resulting next behaviour or next stimulus (with respect to the operator given in the top left cell)
when the stimulus shown in the column header is applied to the behaviour shown in the row header.
E. Abstract Behaviour Specifications
The abstract behaviour specifications for the system agents are given in Fig. 1. The behaviour of the port terminal coordination
system (PCT) can be represented by the concurrent composition of the behaviours of each of the system agents, i.e.,
PCT 7→
〈
PC ∗ SM1 ∗ SM2 ∗ SV1 ∗ SV2 ∗ TM ∗ CM ∗ CC
〉
PC 7→
〈
(MAN1 + MAN2) ; INIT + (CLEAR1 + CLEAR2) ; DEPART
〉
SMi 7→
〈
SRVT + POSN + LEAVE
〉
SVi 7→
〈
CRANES + PLAN + DOCK + RLSE
〉
TM 7→
〈
ALLO + FREE
〉
CM 7→
〈
READ ; CARGO + SEQ ; SERVE + UPDT ; OPER
〉
CC 7→
〈
AVAIL ; ASSGN + NEAR ;MOVE
〉
Fig. 1: Abstract behaviour specification of the port terminal coordination system agents.
TABLE I: Stimulus-response specification of the Port Captain PC.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 MAN1 CLEAR1 MAN1
MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 MAN2 CLEAR2
INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT INIT DEPART DEPART
CLEAR1 MAN1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1 CLEAR1
CLEAR2 MAN2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2 CLEAR2
DEPART DEPART INIT INIT DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART DEPART
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
MAN1 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n deprt1 n
MAN2 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n deprt2
INIT n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
CLEAR1 mnge1 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
CLEAR2 mnge2 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
DEPART n mnge1 mnge2 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
TABLE II: Stimulus-response specification of the Ship Manager SM1.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT POSN SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT
POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN LEAVE POSN POSN POSN
LEAVE LEAVE SRVT LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
SRVT n n n n n n n n dock n n n n n n n n n n n n
POSN n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n deprt1 n n n
LEAVE n ship1 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
TABLE III: Stimulus-response specification of the Ship Manager SM2.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT POSN SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT SRVT
POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN POSN LEAVE POSN POSN
LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE SRVT LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE LEAVE
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
SRVT n n n n n n n n dock n n n n n n n n n n n n
POSN n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n deprt2 n n
LEAVE n n ship2 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
TABLE IV: Stimulus-response specification of the Stevedore SV1.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES PLAN CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES
PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN CRANES PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN DOCK PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN
DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK CRANES DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK RLSE DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK
RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE CRANES RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
CRANES n n n n n n n berth n n n n n n n n n n n n n
PLAN n n n crane1 n n n n n oper1 n n n n n n n n n n n
DOCK n n n crane1 n n n n n n n n n n n n compl1 n n n n
RLSE n n n crane1 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
TABLE V: Stimulus-response specification of the Stevedore SV2.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES PLAN CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES CRANES
PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN CRANES PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN DOCK PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAN
DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK CRANES DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK RLSE DOCK DOCK DOCK DOCK
RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE CRANES RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE RLSE
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
CRANES n n n n n n n berth n n n n n n n n n n n n n
PLAN n n n n crane2 n n n n oper2 n n n n n n n n n n n
DOCK n n n n crane2 n n n n n n n n n n n compl2 n n n n
RLSE n n n n crane2 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
TABLE VI: Stimulus-response specification of the Terminal Manager TM.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO ALLO FREE FREE ALLO ALLO
FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE ALLO ALLO FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE FREE
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
ALLO n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
FREE n n n n n allocd allocd n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
TABLE VII: Stimulus-response specification of the Crane Manager CM.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
READ READ READ READ READ READ READ READ READ READ READ READ READ READ SEQ READ UPDT READ READ READ READ READ
CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO SERVE CARGO OPER CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO CARGO
SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ READ READ SEQ SEQ SEQ UPDT SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ
SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE CARGO CARGO SERVE SERVE SERVE OPER SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE SERVE
UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT READ READ UPDT SEQ UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT UPDT
OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER CARGO CARGO OPER SERVE OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
READ n n n n n n n n n n n n n assgnd n served n n n n n
CARGO n n n n n n n n n n n n n serve n done n n n n n
SEQ n n n n n n n n n n oper1 oper2 n n n served n n n n n
SERVE n n n n n n n n n n carrier carrier n n n done n n n n n
UPDT n n n n n n n n n n oper1 oper2 n assgnd n n n n n n n
OPER n n n n n n n n n n carrier carrier n serve n n n n n n n
TABLE VIII: Stimulus-response specification of the Carrier Coordinator CC.
◦ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL NEAR AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL AVAIL
ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN MOVE ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN ASSGN
NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR AVAIL NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR NEAR
MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE ASSGN MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE MOVE
λ arrive mnge1 mnge2 ship1 ship2 crane1 crane2 allocd berth dock oper1 oper2 carrier assgnd serve served done compl1 compl2 deprt1 deprt2
AVAIL n n n n n n n n n n n n n n serve n n n n n n
ASSGN n n n n n n n n n n n n n n served n n n n n n
NEAR n n n n n n n n n n n n carrier n n n n n n n n
MOVE n n n n n n n n n n n n assgnd n n n n n n n n
F. Concrete Behaviour Specifications
The concrete behaviour specifications for the system agents are given in Figs. 2–7. Note that in the concrete behaviour
specifications, we use functions as a simplification of the specification in places where we are not concerned with how the
system performs the operation. In these cases, we assume that the function arguments are passed by value, meaning that they
can only be referenced, and not defined, in the function. For example, in the concrete behaviour specification of the Carrier
Coordinator CC, there is a function call denoted by ASSIGN(carriers, containers). In this case, the concrete behaviour
references the variables carriers and containers when determining the straddle carrier assignment. Additionally, note that
program variables appearing in all capitals (e.g., SHIP_MANIFEST, SHIP_LENGTH, CRANE_EFF, etc.) denote defined constants.
MAN1
def
= m1 := true;i := 1
MAN2
def
= m2 := true;i := 2
INIT
def
= if (i = 1) −→ manifest[1] := SHIP_MANIFEST;length[1] := SHIP_LENGTH;
numBays[1] := SHIP_BAYS;numContainers[1] := SHIP_CONTAINERS;
arriveT[1] := ARRIVE_TIME;departT[1] := DEPART_TIME;waitT[1] := WAIT_TIME
⌈⌋ (i = 2) −→ manifest[2] := SHIP_MANIFEST;length[2] := SHIP_LENGTH;
numBays[2] := SHIP_BAYS;numContainers[2] := SHIP_CONTAINERS;
arriveT[2] := ARRIVE_TIME;departT[2] := DEPART_TIME;waitT[2] := WAIT_TIME
fi
CLEAR1
def
= m1 := false;i := 1
CLEAR2
def
= m2 := false;i := 2
DEPART
def
= if (i = 1) −→ manifest[1] := null;length[1] := 0;numBays[1] := 0;
numContainers[1] := 0;arriveT[1] := 0;departT[1] := 0;waitT[1] := 0
⌈⌋ (i = 2) −→ manifest[2] := null;length[2] := 0;numBays[2] := 0;
numContainers[2] := 0;arriveT[2] := 0;departT[2] := 0;waitT[2] := 0
fi
Fig. 2: Concrete behaviour specification of the Port Captain PC behaviours.
SRVT
def
= serviceT[i] := departT[i]− arriveT[i]− waitT[i]
POSN
def
= dockPos[i] := berthPos[i]
LEAVE
def
= dockPos[i] := null;serviceT[i] := 0
Fig. 3: Concrete behaviour specification of the Ship Manager behaviours where i = 1 for SM1 and i = 2 for SM2.
CRANES
def
= numCranes[i] := numContainers[i]/(CRANE_EFF ∗ serviceT[i])
PLAN
def
= berthPos[i] := berth[i];
bayPlan[i] := PLAN(berthPos[i],alloCranes[i],manifest[i],numBays[i])
DOCK
def
= docked[i] := true
RLSE
def
= docked[i] := false;berthPos[i] := null;bayPlan[i] := null;numCranes[i] := 0
Fig. 4: Concrete behaviour specification of the Stevedore behaviours where i = 1 for SV1 and i = 2 for SV2.
ALLO
def
= receive y;
if (y ≥ crane1 ) −→ berth[1] := POSITION(numCranes[1]);
alloCranes[1] := ALLOCATE(berth[1])
⌈⌋ (y ≥ crane2 ) −→ berth[2] := POSITION(numCranes[2]);
alloCranes[2] := ALLOCATE(berth[2])
fi
FREE
def
= receive y;
if (y ≥ compl1 ) −→ berth[1] := null;alloCranes[1] := null
⌈⌋ (y ≥ compl2 ) −→ berth[2] := null;alloCranes[2] := null
fi
Fig. 5: Concrete behaviour specification of the Terminal Manager TM behaviours.
READ
def
= receive y;
if (y ≥ oper1 ) −→ plan := bayPlan[1]
⌈⌋ (y ≥ oper2 ) −→ plan := bayPlan[2]
fi
CARGO
def
= containers := CONTAINERS(plan)
SEQ
def
= sequence := SEQUENCE(carrierAssign)
SERVE
def
= position := SERVICE(sequence)
UPDT
def
= plan := UPDATE(carrierState)
OPER
def
= operation := OPERATE(plan)
Fig. 6: Concrete behaviour specification of the Crane Manager CM behaviours.
AVAIL
def
= carriers := AVAIL(carrierState)
ASSGN
def
= carrierAssign := ASSIGN(carriers,containers)
NEAR
def
= nearest := NEAREST(carriers,position)
MOVE
def
= carrierState := MOVE(carrierState,nearest,position)
Fig. 7: Concrete behaviour specification of the Carrier Coordinator CC behaviours.
